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New policies create a new politics: issues of
institutional design in climate change policy
Henry Ergas†

Institutional design focuses on the task of providing accountability and eﬀective monitoring of decision-making by bodies vested with the coercive powers of the state in a
context where information is inherently limited, costly to acquire and asymmetrically
distributed. This paper focuses on issues of institutional design in the context of climate change policy. It examines proposals advanced in the June 2008 Draft and Final
Reports of the Garnaut Climate Change Review (‘Garnaut Reports’), and in the
Government’s July 2008 Green Paper and December 2008 White Paper on the Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme (‘Green and White Papers’) with respect to how revenues
raised by the sale of emissions permits would be used; and second, the proposed governance arrangements for the emissions trading scheme.
Key words: agency problems, climate change, corrective taxation, delegation, emissions
trading, public economics.

1. Introduction
Arguably, the most important issue that the modern literature on institutional design focuses on is the task of providing accountability and eﬀective
monitoring of decision-making by bodies vested with the coercive powers of
the state in a context where information is inherently limited, costly to
acquire and asymmetrically distributed.1 These information imperfections
create scope for rent-seeking, which results in both an allocative ineﬃciency –
in the sense that the policies pursued do not reﬂect underlying preferences –
and in productive ineﬃciency, in that policy objectives are pursued at higher
than eﬃcient cost. While the conventional prescription for reducing vulnerability to rent-seeking is to insulate the policy process from interest group pressures, this conﬂicts both with eﬀective accountability and with the need for
policy to adjust to changes in preferences, information and choice sets. Further aggravating the diﬃculties is the inherent conﬂict between this need for
policy adaptability on the one hand, and the contribution policy credibility
and stability can make to the eﬃciency of policy on the other. These three
†

Henry Ergas (email: ergas.henry@gmail.com) is Senior Economic Adviser at Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu.
1
The underlying assumption is that eﬀective monitoring will yield decisions that accord
with the preferences of voters. Of course, voters may choose to structure institutions so as to
achieve goals other than eﬀective monitoring, but then that merely raises the question of how
those institutions will be controlled. For a general discussion of institutional design, see Komesar (1997).
Ó 2010 The Author
Journal compilation Ó 2010 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8489.2010.00484.x

144

H. Ergas

elements of the institutional design dilemma – limited information, rent-seeking, and costly commitment – deﬁne a world where there are no solutions but
only trade-oﬀs.
Although these trade-oﬀs are not very diﬀerent across policy areas, the
focus of this paper is on environmental policy. Within environmental policy,
few areas are as high on the current agenda as climate change. I will therefore focus on climate change policy, and speciﬁcally on the proposals
advanced in the June 2008 Draft Report of the Garnaut Climate Change
Review (‘Garnaut Report’), and in the Government’s July 2008 Green Paper
on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (‘Green Paper’) which is essentially reiterated in the September 2008 Final Report of the Garnaut Climate
Change Review and the Government’s December 2008 White Paper on the
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (‘White Paper’). I note that in doing
so, my paper is not intended to be a comprehensive critique of the Garnaut
Report and the proposals emanating from that report and that the fact that
I deal with only a few of the issues those reports raise should not be viewed
as endorsing the stance they take on those issues that I do not cover.
Speciﬁcally, I will examine ﬁrst, the proposals for how revenues raised by
the sale of emissions permits would be used; and second, the proposed governance arrangements for the emissions trading scheme. Each of these raises
interesting and important issues of institutional design, and of broader policy analysis. I will examine for each of these the broader principles of institutional design that are involved, and then apply those principles to the
speciﬁc proposals.
2. Use of ETS revenues
According to the Green Paper:
The Government has committed that every cent raised for the Australian Government from the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme will
be used to help Australians – households and business – adjust to
the scheme and to invest in clean energy options. (Green Paper,
p. 277).
Revenues raised from the scheme have, in other words, been earmarked for
outlays on adjustment, compensation and the promotion of ‘clean energy’,
including through investment in low emissions R&D. These commitments
have been retained in the White Paper (see Chapters 17 and 18).
Generally, the revenues raised through Pigouvian taxes are large relative to
the direct eﬃciency changes those taxes induce.2 This means that the eﬃciency with which those revenues are spent can dramatically aﬀect the overall
2
Simply put, this is because the revenues raised are a rectangle, while the eﬃciency change is
a triangle.
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eﬃciency of the Pigouvian scheme.3 It is therefore important to examine the
extent to which the proposed earmarking is likely to encourage the eﬃcient
use of the revenues generated by the ETS.4
2.1

Earmarking generally

Earmarking, also commonly referred to as revenue hypothecation, can
enhance the quality of public expenditure in three broad ways.5
First and most important, it has been argued that earmarking can signal
the tax price of achieving particular outcomes and thereby improve
accountability for, and public decisions about, public expenditure. For
these improvements to occur, there must be a rational relation between the
tax and the outcomes (so that the tax is a payment for the beneﬁts, rather
than serving some other purpose6), expenditures on the outcome must be
determined at the margin by the tax (i.e. the hypothecation must have
bite), and tax-payers must be able to monitor the linkage and the use of
the revenues.
Second, it is said that earmarking could alter incentives for program
administrators, including by constraining spending decisions and changing
the marginal costs and beneﬁts associated with alternative options. For example, where two activities are complements (i.e. an increase in the supply of
one reduces the marginal cost or increases the marginal beneﬁt of an increase
in the supply of the other) but diligence in one is observable while diligence in
the other is not, bundling the two and ascribing to them a dedicated revenue
stream may be eﬃcient.
Third, it has also been argued that earmarking may be a way of increasing the credibility of promises, reducing the inherent incompleteness of the
implied contracts between government and the public. As well as any direct
beneﬁts arising from greater credibility of commitments, this may allow proponents of programs to signal the quality of the programs, of the proponents or both. For example, in the model of Brett and Keen (2000), a
commitment to dedicate revenues to a particular use, which is of value
to the public but would not be of value to a ‘poor quality’ politician, can
3
This is one reason why the conventional prescription in the case of Pigouvian taxes is for
the revenues to be used to provide lump sum transfers to tax-payers.
4
Useful discussions of earmarking can be found in Bird and Jun (2005); Eklund (1972);
Glazer and Proost (2007); Spackman (1997); Teja (1988) and Wilkinson (1994), among many
others.
5
See references cited in footnote 6 for an overview of beneﬁts and costs discussed in the literature.
6
Some hypothecation – such as the widespread linking of revenues from government lotteries to ‘merit goods’ such as education or culture – is obviously unlikely to improve the quality
of public decision-making in that there is no meaningful sense in which the ‘price’ of culture at
the margin is the loss of welfare associated with the holding of lotteries. As a result, the
hypothecation does not signal the cost of expanding the supply of culture, will not induce revelation of marginal valuations of culture, and will not ‘unbundle’ tax-payer decisions about the
supply of culture from other decisions.
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support a separating equilibrium in which politicians signal their quality to
the electorate.
That said, there are also at least four important ways in which earmarking
can reduce eﬃciency in public expenditures.
First, earmarking implies inﬂexibility in the allocation of revenues among
competing uses. If the earmarking is substantive, in the sense of being eﬀectively constraining, social rates of return are unlikely to be equalised at the
margin across uses. Tax rates, expenditure levels or more likely both, will be
distorted as a consequence.
Second, reserving revenues to a program gives it a monopoly over those
revenues, encouraging and potentially perpetuating technical ineﬃciency in
its supply.
Third, earmarking can facilitate rent-seeking by allowing the interest
groups that beneﬁt from the hypothecated revenue stream to more eﬀectively
focus their activities. Rather than competing against other interest groups for
a larger share of general revenues, the relevant groups can limit their eﬀorts
to seeking an increase in (or protecting from erosion) the hypothecated tax.
At the same time, the political commitment they secure is potentially made
more credible by the earmarking, increasing both the ‘price’ the interest
groups are willing to pay in exchange and the resources they are willing to dissipate in obtaining it. Rent-seeking coalitions therefore become easier to create and sustain, and the aggregate costs to the community from rent-seeking
rise, as Kimenyi, Lee and Tollinson (1990) found in their study of the US
Highway Trust Fund.
Fourth, these adverse consequences are made all the greater by the risk earmarking creates of ﬁscal illusion, i.e. of the hypothecated revenues not being
as visible as other forms of public revenue and expenditure. The Garnaut
Report provides a striking example of ﬁscal illusion when it claims that using
revenues from ETS auctions for the earmarked purposes allows those purposes to be achieved ‘without placing pressure on public ﬁnances’ (p. 372) –
ignoring the fact that devoting the revenues to those purposes has an
opportunity cost.7
By and large, empirical studies of earmarking ﬁnd that these harmful
eﬀects outweigh the positive eﬀects hypothecation can have. For example,
a series of recent, careful, assessments of earmarked transport programs in
7

Arguably a comparison can be made here with hopes placed in the so-called ‘purchaser
provider’ split model of government service provision which downplayed the fact that it
tended to leave the purpose of government spending channelled through such models unscrutinised or at best does not resolve the need to periodically assess the purposes behind various
forms of government service provision. For instance, commenting on the UK and New Zealand experience with such models in health, Street (1994) notes that: ‘Experience from the
UK and NZ suggests that it is unlikely that the problems of priority setting will be resolved
by independent non-elected bodies. Although it may be valuable to have purchasing authorities promoting discussion of the issues, the questions of resource allocation cannot be
avoided under a purchaser/provider separation any more than under other forms of health
system organisation’.
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Europe – where congestion or road toll charges have been earmarked for
public transport programs – generally ﬁnd that the hypothecation has been
wasteful.8 First, putting income distribution consequences aside, congestion
and higher road use charges should lead to lower subsidies and higher
prices for public transport,9 but hypothecation has caused the eﬀect to go
in the opposite direction, causing an eﬃciency loss. Second, many of the
programs funded, or proposed to be funded, by hypothecated funds have
had very low social rates of return, both in absolute and relative terms, to
alternative uses of the funds. Third, any income distribution consequences
of the changes in road pricing would be more eﬃciently dealt with through
direct transfers,10 rather than through public transport subsidies, which,
given use patterns of public transport, are a poor way of achieving distributional goals.
2.2

Earmarking in the Garnaut Reports and the Green and White Papers

As the transport case illustrates, any assessment of earmarking needs to look
to the speciﬁcs of the proposal, and the earmarking proposed in the Garnaut
Reports (Draft and Final versions) and the Green and White Papers are no
exception to this rule.
At the most general level, it seems obvious that the earmarking these documents propose bears no relationship to the Lindahl-Buchanan approach of
beneﬁts taxation. In particular, there is no sense in which the proposed
charges are the ‘tax price’ of the outcomes being sought through the outlays.
Moreover, there is no commitment to limit expenditures on those outcomes
to the quantum of the revenues raised. Finally, the bundling of outlays on
8

See de Palma et al. (2007).
Subsidies to public transport are justiﬁed to a greater or lesser degree by the under-pricing
of road use. When road use charges are set at (or closer to) Pigouvian levels, the eﬃcient subsidy to other transport modes declines.
10
The funds raised by the charges could then have been used to reduce other, more distorting, taxes. Elaborating on this point, the direct burden of taxation is larger than necessary to
raise a given amount of revenue. This is because taxes alter individual incentives and economic
decisions at the margin, and therefore aﬀect economic outcomes at the margin and in the
aggregate. In driving a wedge between bid and ask prices for economic resources, taxes eradicate the opportunity for individuals to exploit all gains from trade. Because the revenue raised
is typically not suﬃcient to oﬀset the value of the foregone gains from trade, the direct burden
exceeds the revenue collected, and so most taxes are said to create an excess burden or deadweight loss. The size of this deadweight loss is proportional to the extent to which individuals
divert resources towards lower valued uses in response to the tax. The marginal excess burden
(MEB) of a tax describes how the excess burden changes as a tax is changed by a very small
amount. Some taxes have higher MEB than others, but they may also raise more revenue at
the margin. Thus, a natural measure of the welfare cost of a tax that can be used to compare
the eﬃciency consequences of diﬀerent kinds of taxes is the normalised marginal excess burden
(NMEB) of a tax, which measures the MEB per dollar of revenue raised. By deﬁnition, a pure
Pigouvian tax involves no deadweight loss, i.e. causes no excess burden. As a result, using the
revenues from a pure Pigouvian tax to reduce other taxes increases welfare by the extent of the
excess burden foregone.
9
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compensation, income support, spending for energy eﬃciency and for investment in ‘clean energy options’ undermines the transparency that is integral to
the eﬀectiveness of earmarked schemes of beneﬁts taxation.
The resulting concerns are made all the greater by the speciﬁc proposed
uses of the funds. While there has been extensive public discussion of the
proposed compensation to more emissions-intensive industries, the other
elements in the package can also be shown to be of concern.
First, some of the alleged market failures on which spending is to be targeted seem poorly thought through. The discussion of buildings in both documents is a case in point, with the Garnaut Report claiming, for example, that
the fact that rented houses contain older, less ‘energy-eﬃcient’ appliances
than those found in houses owner-occupied evidences a market failure that
should be addressed through subsidies and regulations (see for example
section 17.3.1 of the Final Report).
However, rented accommodation may be older and/or generally lower
quality than owner-occupied housing: usually, the most eﬃcient way of providing lower quality accommodation is to build high quality accommodation
and allow it to deteriorate over time.11 As a result, rental housing will
embody older vintages, and – as in the rest of the economy – it is incorrect to
think that eﬃciency is increased by forced scrapping of vintages whose operating costs, though relatively high, are still less than the eﬀective average total
costs12 of more recent equipment. Additionally, to the extent to which tenants
value more ‘energy-eﬃcient’ appliances at more than their eﬀective average
total cost, it is not obvious why this outcome would not be achieved through
appropriate contracts with landlords. And if there is an impediment to that
outcome being achieved, it seems more likely to lie in tenancy laws, which
reduce landlords’ incentive to invest in higher quality,13 than in any market
failure as such.14
All of this merely highlights the more general point, which is that especially
when price signals are set correctly (as is the aim of the ETS), ‘energy eﬃ11
See the discussion of equilibrium in the housing market in O’Flaherty (2005) at pages 410
and follows. The intuition behind this result is simple. Assume the objective is to provide low
quality, rental, accommodation in ten years’ time. One way of doing this is to set aside today
an amount suﬃcient to build such accommodation at that time. The alternative is to build high
quality accommodation now and allow it to deteriorate gradually over time. So long as the rental rate on high quality accommodation is more than the interest rate, the latter alternative will
dominate. In equilibrium, the rental rate will decline to the point which just makes these
options equivalent.
12
These costs are higher than average total costs for owner occupiers, both because of transaction costs and because of higher rates of depreciation associated with moral hazard (i.e. the
tendency of tenants to take less care of equipment they do not own).
13
See again, O’Flaherty (2005) at pages 372 and follows.
14
Capital market rationing is sometimes said to lead to ineﬃciently slow scrapping of outdated vintages of consumer durables. While this is obviously possible, the same capital market
failures would aﬀect a wide range of household investment decisions, and it is not clear why
welfare would be improved by addressing them in respect of one type of appliance (namely,
those that are especially energy intensive). Moreover, capital market rationing is not likely to
aﬀect investment decisions by landlords.

Ó 2010 The Author
Journal compilation Ó 2010 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

New policies create a new politics

149

ciency’ is not a sensible goal in itself, any more than is ‘making Pavlovas using
less passionfruit’, as it may indeed be eﬃcient in an overall sense to use more
energy per unit of output rather than less in particular situations.15
Second, while there likely is a case for promoting innovations that reduce
the carbon intensity of output, the approach proposed in the Garnaut
Reports and the Green and White Papers seems ﬂawed. The essence of this
approach is to link the funding of this R&D to ETS receipts, and through
that linkage, increase outlays on that R&D substantially.
However, this straightforwardly positive linkage between the funding of
these innovations and receipts from the sale of emissions permits does not ﬁt
economic logic. A straightforward application of the Sandmo rule for Pigouvian pricing in the presence of substitutes (Sandmo 1976) dictates that the
greater the likelihood of investment in low emissions R&D succeeding, the
lower should be the current ETS price and hence the receipts from the ETS,
which goes in the opposite direction of the crude linkage between receipts and
outlays facilitated by the earmarking proposal. As a result, the linkage is
likely to distort the carbon price, the volume of resources devoted to low
emissions R&D, or both. More importantly, rather than providing a dedicated revenue stream for low emissions R&D, it seems preferable to include
realistic estimates of any positive externalities in the assessment of the beneﬁts
from R&D proposals generally, and then subject those proposals to the same
decision criteria, regardless of the technology or industry to which they
relate.16 To the extent to which the general process for allocating R&D funding is ﬂawed, this is best addressed through a review of current policies promoting innovation. This is consistent with the Tinbergen-Mundell insight
that if a policy instrument can directly address a market imperfection then it
should be relied on, rather than an alternative instrument that can only indirectly address the issue.17 This is because any indirect intervention distorts
economic choices, and is likely to have a weaker impact on the intended indirect target than direct regulation, and the impacts of the indirect approach
are likely to be harder to predict than those of the direct approach.
In contrast, the approach proposed by the Garnaut Reports and the Green
and White Papers would distort the allocation of resources as between
competing uses of scarce R&D resources.
15
For instance, the rental housing may actually be provided at minimum social cost, even if
it involves using older appliances that have higher energy use than do the most recent vintages.
It is an obvious fallacy to think costs are minimised by constantly scrapping older vintages so
as to always use equipment of the most recent vintage.
16
There is no reason to believe this is more diﬃcult for low emissions R&D than it is for
other types of R&D, but even if it were, this could be dealt with by applying a mark-up to the
measurable beneﬁts.
17
Tinbergen (1956). The principle was later elucidated by Mundell in the area of macroeconomic management. The resulting Tinbergen-Mundell approach states that there must be as
many independent policy instruments as there are policy targets and secondly that a policy
instrument should be assigned to the policy target on which it has the maximal eﬀect. See Mundell (1962).
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These distortions are likely to be all the greater given that the supply of
research scientists and engineers is likely to be relatively inelastic, even in
the medium term. Additional earmarked funding for one type of R&D is
then likely to merely increase payments to scientists and engineers as the
favoured form of research bids resources away from other, less favoured,
types of R&D.18 The fact that assessments of earmarked R&D projects ﬁnd
that the earmarked funding increases the output of scientiﬁc research, as
measured by number of publications, but that the publications have relatively low citation rates, suggests that these displacement eﬀects can be
socially highly costly.19 Accentuating these concerns is the more general
ﬁnding that especially ‘but not solely’ for basic research, progress primarily
reﬂects scientiﬁc and technological opportunity, and attempts to speed up
the rate of progress lead to rapidly decreasing quality, rapidly rising costs,
or both.20 The frequently observed ineﬃciencies in the selection and governance of large publicly-funded R&D projects only make these risks more
acute.21 The ineﬃciency arising from distorting the pattern of R&D would
then be compounded by ineﬀectiveness in actually promoting scientiﬁc and
technological advance.
Finally, to the extent to which the results of low emissions research are
indeed a public good, or at least confer substantial beneﬁts on the world as a
whole, that needs to be taken into account in determining the appropriate
level of funding, exactly as we would in other areas.22 This is even more
plainly the case where the results of that research (for instance, in renewables)
could reduce world demand for (and the prices we receive for) Australian
exports, for instance of coal.23 In that case, increasing funding for those technologies could involve a two-fold loss to the Australian economy, as Austra18
The impact of the elasticity of supply of scientists and engineers was discussed in Ergas
(1984) and is examined in Goolsbee (1998). The fact that (according to ABS
81090DO003_200607) environmentally-related R&D already accounts for 20 per cent of all
Government-funded R&D in Australia, exceeding health and defence, and only slightly less
than is spent on primary industries, itself suggests that further expansion may be diﬃcult and
highly costly.
19
See for example Martin (1992) and Payne (2002). Typically, these studies refer to congressional earmarks in the US, rather than to hypothecated funding as such. However, the causal
mechanisms that lead to poor quality outcomes are likely to be similar – the restriction of competition for the funding and the fact that with given funding, the scarcity of high quality projects means that some low quality projects will be funded.
20
The hypothesis that the underlying rate of scientiﬁc progress is not all that responsive to
rates of eﬀort was famously set out by Derek de Solla Price, see for example de Solla Price
(1986) at pages 92 and follows. See also for basic research Stephan and Levin (1992). George
Stigler’s well-known ‘law’ (in Stigler 1984) that at any one time, there are no more than 14
really ﬁrst class scholars in any ﬁeld of research, is fully consistent with de Solla Price’s results.
21
See for example Jewkes et al. (1969); Henderson (1977); Ergas (1984, 1987); Finon (1989);
Keck (1988); and Cohen and Noll (1991).
22
See for instance Alston and Mullen (1992) and Alston et al. (2004).
23
Obviously, the same issues arise if the R&D results in supply shifts that transfer surplus
to foreign consumers, as would occur for example, if exports are a signiﬁcant share of output
and the supply shift is pivotal rather than parallel.
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lians would pay both through the increased price of carbon emissions and
through the loss of income consequent on the use of the technology.
Third, the proposed compensation to low and middle income earners may
be both unnecessary and ineﬃcient.
The case for that compensation is explained in the Green Paper in terms
of the higher share of emissions-intensive goods in the consumption baskets
of low income households and is reiterated in the White Paper (Chapter
17). However, what would seem to matter more from an equity perspective
is the share of those goods in the consumption of low consumption households, as some households (notably the elderly) with low incomes may be
living oﬀ accumulated capital and in that sense, not be particularly disadvantaged. Indeed, US evidence suggests that while the emissions intensity
of consumption is relatively high for low income households, it is not
equally high for low consumption households, and the income-related gap
in emissions intensity is even lower when income is measured on a life-time
basis (thus eliminating the eﬀect of transitory income shocks).24 As a result,
it remains to be demonstrated that the price changes consequent on an ETS
will cause disproportionately large real income losses for disadvantaged
households.
That said, truly disadvantaged households in Australia are likely to be
recipients of government pensions and other beneﬁts, and those payments are
indexed in a way that appears to cope relatively well with relative price
shocks.25 As a result, the Government’s commitment to provide compensation above and beyond the eﬀect picked up through beneﬁt indexation suggests a real increase in beneﬁt levels. The justiﬁcation for such an increase is
unclear. It is even less clear why speciﬁc compensation would also be provided to middle income households. As for the notion, suggested in the Green
Paper (see for example page 80), that the budgets of those households, i.e. of
the vast majority of Australians, could be fully compensated for the impact
of an ETS, it seems diﬃcult to reconcile with the fact that introducing a binding carbon tax must impose a cost on the economy and hence reduce at least
some real incomes.
Be that as it may, the eﬀect of thus providing compensation, in a way
slanted to low and middle income earners, would be to increase the eﬀective progressivity of the tax/beneﬁt structure, i.e. the eﬀective marginal tax
rate on labour incomes. However, it seems likely (Bovenberg and de Mooj
1994 and Parry and Oates 2000) that a carbon tax will itself increase the
tax on labour relative to leisure, thus accentuating the disincentives to
work arising from the tax structure.26 Further increasing the distortion,
24

Hassett et al. (2007).
See the estimates of growth in the real value of pensions provided in Harmer (2008), for
example at pages 77–78.
26
While Australia has a relatively low average tax rate on labour income by OECD standards, the progressivity of the personal income tax structure is relatively high. See OECD
(2007).
25
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thereby increasing the economic cost of the carbon tax, seems very diﬃcult
to justify.
In short, the proposed earmarking does not seem likely to increase the
quality of public expenditures. Rather, the earmarked expenditure programs
appear to be of low quality, at least from the standpoint of aggregate welfare.
It would likely be greatly superior to use the revenues from the scheme to
reduce distorting tax rates, for instance, by ﬂattening the structure of the personal income tax.
Indeed, as explained by Fullerton and Metcalf (2001), this policy prescription – that the revenues collected through the sale of pollution permits should
be used to fund reductions in other, distorting, taxes – is fairly robust. In
eﬀect, the revenue raised from the sale of the permits reﬂects a scarcity rent
associated with restricting access to the pollutant. The eﬀect of that scarcity
rent is to increase production costs by more than the minimum necessary, as
ﬁrms must both incur the ‘real’ outlays associated with reducing emissions
and pay the tax. This will reduce real net wages, with adverse consequences
for labour supply. It is diﬃcult to do better, from an aggregate welfare perspective, than to use the revenues to oﬀset this eﬀect through a reduction in
other taxes on production.
In contrast, the earmarking proposed in the Garnaut Report and the Green
and White Papers seems likely to inﬂict a double loss on the Australian economy: the loss associated with the increase in production costs; and the loss
associated with wasting the funds raised through the sale of permits.
3. Scheme governance
I turn now to the issues associated with scheme governance. Attention here
focuses on the question of where responsibility should lie for determining the
path of emissions, administering targets and allocating compensation, and
what role, if any, should be played in these by a carbon ‘central bank’. The
more general question is that of the appropriate division of labour between
diﬀering kinds of institutions, notably executive government (Ministers and
their departments, answering to parliament) on the one hand, and what are
often referred to as ‘non-majoritarian institutions’ (such as independent agencies and courts) on the other.27
These non-majoritarian institutions reﬂect the delegation, by the electorate as the principal, of authority to an agent, with the extent of that authority being deﬁned by the scope of the delegated powers (in substance, the
policy discretion) granted that agent relative to the control instruments (i.e.
powers to shape, constrain, reverse or annul outcomes) on which the princi27
Such an institution can be deﬁned as one that (a) possesses and exercises a grant of specialised public authority separate from that of other institutions, and (b) is neither directly elected
by the people nor directly managed by elected oﬃcials. See Thatcher and Sweet (2003) at page
2 and also Vibert (2007).
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pal can rely. While non-majoritarian institutions play a wide variety of roles
in democratic systems of government,28 and have an especially long history
in Australia,29 two eﬃciency objectives that can be served by thus delegating
powers are of particular interest. These are ﬁrst, resolving commitment
problems, i.e. enhancing the credibility of actual or implied promises, and
second, reducing vulnerability to rent-seeking.30
These objectives can be enhanced by delegation if delegation confers
what can be very loosely described as ‘greater distance’ from immediate
pressures and provides incentives for those to whom power is delegated to
act in ways that reﬂect that ‘greater distance’ while nonetheless conforming to the public interest, at least in some net sense.31 As with earmarking, there is a ‘tying the hands’ eﬀect, in which, in principle, governments
improve outcomes by reducing the scope of their discretionary powers.
Inevitably, that reduced scope has some cost, and the issue is whether that
cost is worth bearing. In considering that issue, I will deal ﬁrst with the
question of the credibility of long term commitments and then with that
of rent-seeking.
The credibility of commitments becomes especially important when it is
desirable for economic agents to make investments that have an element of
irreversibility in reliance on actual or implied policy promises, and which
hence are vulnerable to loss should those promises not be kept. Time inconsistency is the canonical form of this commitment problem in economics, with
the term referring to situations in which conduct by a policy-maker that is
rational ex ante is not (and is known not to be) rational ex post, so that
rational actors will discount the probability of a commitment to that conduct
being maintained.
28

See for instance Holmes (1995).
Thus, Parker, writing in the 1960s, noted the ‘long established habit, carried further, perhaps in Australia than in any other advanced society, of institutionalising the resolution of
conﬂicts over the allocation of values. Its central feature is the attempt to remove important
allocative decisions from a process of ad hoc bargaining or trials of strength, based on the relative power of competing interest groups, to a system of adjudication by committees, boards,
tribunals, departmental agencies, autonomous corporations and similar institutional devices’:
Parker (1965), pp. 88–89; see also Hughes (1980) for a more extensive review of the history and
role of delegated powers in Australia.
30
A third eﬃciency objective often ascribed to these institutions is that of overcoming information asymmetries in technical areas of governance through the development and deployment of specialised expertise. However, it is not apparent, as a general matter, why similar
expertise could not be secured within executive government, and there is little evidence that
non-majoritarian institutions enjoy a clear advantage in this respect relative to executive government, for example in the Australian system of government. That said, where the primary
reason for delegation is to secure access to expertise, one would expect the relevant agency to
have limited substantive decisional independence, for instance, in terms of making and implementing policy. This is consistent with the observations in Thatcher and Stevens, who ﬁnd that
‘expertise based’ agencies are more likely to have what amount to advisory roles (or at least,
are more readily over-ruled) than do agencies that seem aimed at addressing credible commitment and rent-seeking issues.
31
In other words, the gains from the delegation exceed the costs in terms of reduced responsiveness to community preferences.
29
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The problem of time consistency is readily illustrated. Consider a central
bank facing a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment, in which current inﬂation depends also on expectations of inﬂation in the future (Schaumburg and Tambalotti 2007). The credible announcement of a future policy
tightening, in excess of that needed to curb current inﬂationary pressures,
lowers inﬂationary expectations, thereby easing today’s trade-oﬀ. Given that,
it is optimal for policy to seek to exhaust the marginal beneﬁts of this
announcement eﬀect. However, once the recession this tightening implies
arrives, the optimal policy is to reverse course, renege on the announcement
and avoid the recession. But for the original intention to have the desired
eﬀect, it must be believed to be credible – in other words, for the sacriﬁce ratio
(the cumulative increase in unemployment that is due to the disinﬂation eﬀort
divided by the total decrease in inﬂation) to be improved, investors, wage-setters and other price-making actors must believe that the central bank will not
deviate from the policy it has announced, regardless of the consequences. The
lower the probability attached to the central bank staying the course, the less
eﬀect the announcement will have on the costs of disinﬂation.
At least analytically, a similar issue of time consistency arises in respect of
pollution taxes, in so far as the objective of those taxes is to induce investment, including through innovation, that once made is sunk.
Laﬀont and Tirole (1996), for example, model a pollution tax that is
intended to promote low-pollution innovation, where the innovation, once
made, has low constant marginal costs. The government issuing the permits
can then act opportunistically, expanding (or threatening to expand) the supply of permits post-innovation, reducing the innovator’s bargaining power
with respect to potential users. Ex post, this allows the government to pursue
its objective of reducing pollution at lower social cost; however, the likelihood
of this time inconsistent behaviour reduces the ex ante incentives to innovate,
thereby increasing costs overall. The greater the likelihood of ex post opportunism, the higher the aggregate social costs will be of achieving the pollution
reduction target.32
When the ex post proﬁtability of innovation depends on artiﬁcial scarcity –
as is the case in an ETS – there is a risk that does not arise in other contexts:
that to expropriate the innovator, government may not need to modify intellectual property rights (which would likely be highly politically costly) but
can simply rely on its ability to alter the supply of pollution rights. As with
time consistency risks generally, the scope this oﬀers for opportunistic conduct will deter otherwise eﬃcient investment.
In Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 ﬁlm ‘Doctor Strangelove’, the time consistency
problem is solved through a commitment technology – the ‘doomsday
machine’ – that once put in place, will, in the event of a surprise nuclear
32

Additionally, it can be shown that the slower the rate at which the new technology is likely
to become obsolete, the greater the incentive for the permit issuer to act opportunistically. See
Levine et al. (2005).
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attack, automatically ‘destroy all human and animal life on earth’, despite the
fact that it ‘is not a thing a sane man would do’.33 In the economic literature,
the institutional equivalent of the ‘doomsday machine’ is the independent
central bank, which, vested with the discretion to control inﬂation, does not
succumb to the temptation to seek short term gains in real output at the
expense of long term price stability.
This occurs because the central bank, unlike the executive government,
does not internalise (or internalise to the same extent) the political beneﬁts
that short term output expansion would create. In other words, by delegating
the control of inﬂation to the central bank, the government severs the costs
and beneﬁts of the inﬂation–real output trade-oﬀ, assigning the price stability
objective to an agent whose beneﬁts depend mainly or solely on the inﬂation
rate. In its simplest form (often referred to as ‘Rogoﬀ delegation’, after Rogoﬀ (1985)), this is done by vesting control of the central bank in individuals
who are especially ‘conservative’, in the special sense of having an unusually
strong aversion to inﬂation, i.e. having a utility function in which immediate
real output gaps have little weight relative to long run price stability. Given
those preferences, commitments to price stability will be regarded as credible,
reducing the costs of disinﬂation.34
Whether this account of central bank independence is plausible is a matter
of intense debate, both as regards the solidity of its theoretical foundations35
and its empirical relevance.36 So too is the question of whether, as a factual
matter, central bank independence, however deﬁned, actually reduces the sacriﬁce ratio, with perhaps the best that can be said being that the case in favour
of independence is not proven.37
That said, it may be that time consistency issues would have greater weight
in the context of the introduction of an entirely new set of ‘ﬁat rights’, such as
those involved in an ETS.38 This view is expressed in the Final Garnaut
33
The underlying principle of seeking to achieve deterrence through credible commitments
to mutual assured destruction is classically set out in Schelling (1980). The origins of this principle are discussed in Ayson (2004).
34
The same outcome can be achieved by other means, for instance, by assuming the central
bank owns a ‘reputational capital stock’ that would be devalued in the event of time inconsistency, making deviation from an anti-inﬂation stance costlier for the central bank than for
other decision-makers.
35
See notably McCallum (1995, 1997). More generally, any credible account of central bank
independence that justiﬁes independence on the basis of time consistency must explain why the
arrangement is not vulnerable to renegotiation, especially if politicians would, in fact, derive
signiﬁcant beneﬁt (even if only short term) from acting in a time-inconsistent manner. This
inevitably goes to issues of political structure, which are discussed in Keefer and Stasavage
(2003); Lohmann (2003) and Moser (1999).
36
For example, Bell (2004), in his review of the development of central bank independence
in Australia, concludes that time consistency issues played no role.
37
See for example Berger et al. (2001), who conclude that independence does not reduce,
and may in some conditions actually increase, the sacriﬁce ratio, and more recently, Crowe
and Meade (2007), who ﬁnd that any signiﬁcant relation between central bank independence
that may have been found in earlier data sets no longer persists.
38
Lohmann (2003) discusses ‘ﬁat institutions’ and their credibility.
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Report, which notes that ‘markets can quickly collapse if their credibility is
shaken. This is all the more pertinent for markets that owe their existence
solely to government decree’ (page 323). However, to the extent to which the
key issue is that of underpinning conﬁdence in irreversible investments in
abatement (that is, abatement investments whose proﬁtability depends on the
path of future carbon prices), this leads to somewhat diﬀerent conclusions
than might be initially thought.
In particular, unlike the central bank case, where the bank must be
assumed to have (or be induced to act as if it had) an unusually strong preference for price stability, in an ETS, the entity setting policy, were it seeking to
overcome perceived risks of time inconsistency, would need to place a particularly high weight on industry proﬁts, as compared to abatement.39 This is
simply because ex post (that is, once successful innovation has occurred), the
greater the weight placed on abatement, the greater the attractiveness to the
agency of acting opportunistically, forcing down the price of the new technology and thereby securing widespread use. What is therefore required ex ante
is a credible commitment to forego what in ex post terms are socially proﬁtable opportunities for abatement, thereby increasing the expected return on
investment in innovation. Moreover, the greater the uncertainty about the
ﬁxed costs innovators will incur, the greater must be the willingness to allow
prices ex post to be marked up above cost, thereby further reducing ex post
abatement.40 The arguments here for ﬁxing the appropriate scope of governmental discretion in the determination of a carbon price therefore has some
overlap with the arguments addressed in the academic literature on sovereign
or regulatory risk, and on regulatory takings and eminent domain, which also
deal with the tendency of governments in the absence of appropriate constraints on their discretion, to intervene in a manner which could adversely
damage investment incentives.41

39

This is similar to the utility regulation case, discussed in Gilbert and Newbery (1994) and
Levine et al. (2005).
40
There is, in other words, an information rent, which in expectational terms, must be
greater, the greater is the information asymmetry about the cost of the innovative technology.
41
For an overview of the implications of regulatory risk and its consequences for investment
in infrastructure industries see Ergas et al. (2001). For a general overview of the economic
eﬀects of uncertainty, including through regulation, on investment incentives, see Dixit and
Pindyck (1994). On regulatory takings and eminent domain, see for instance, Blume et al.
(1984) and Miceli and Segerson (1994) who study the problem of how the regulator is
‘captured’ by anti-development interests and would weigh the beneﬁts of regulation only
against direct ﬁscal outlays (compensation payments). This gives rise to the conclusion in these
papers that costs borne by property owners are given no weight in the regulator’s decision and
therefore the requirement for compensation can increase eﬃciency of regulatory decisionmaking by forcing the regulator to internalize otherwise unweighted costs. Expanding on this,
Fischel and Shapiro (1988) ﬁnd that positive (though not full) compensation is desirable when
regulatory decisions are expected to be made on the basis of majoritarian voting or by medianvoters. Schieﬀer (2007) reviews the past literature on these areas and sets out the conditions
under which full compensation can be justiﬁed on eﬃciency grounds but also attaches a caveat
to this result where the government faces budget constraints and limited powers of taxation.
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What the relevant theory would recommend, in other words, is selecting as
the agent setting future price paths an agent who places an especially
low, rather than an especially high, weight on abatement, relative to industry
proﬁts.
Of course, such an assignment of policy responsibilities would have
costs, as well as potential beneﬁts. So as to limit monitoring and agency
costs, delegation is frequently accompanied by rigid rules, which must
impede the response to new information, including changes in the public’s
preferences. Moreover, so as to allow economic actors to distinguish
opportunism on the one hand, from justiﬁed changes in policy conditional
on new information on the other, the institution itself needs to rely on
rule-conforming behaviour, even when that is costly.42 This is especially
likely to be true when institutions are relatively new. Finally, the stress on
rule-conformity in decision-making is likely to be especially great when
agency performance is diﬃcult to measure in terms of outcomes, or when
the relation between instruments, outputs and ﬁnal (welfare-determining)
outcomes is uncertain. All of these factors are likely to be relevant in the
context of a carbon ‘central bank’.
The greater the need for ongoing ﬂexibility, the higher the cost of rule-oriented delegation will be. As well as those direct costs, delegation of a speciﬁc
task (such as that of setting a path for future emissions reductions) may prevent the ‘bundling’ of responses to new information with other policy instruments, with the failure to secure economies of scope as between these
instruments causing an eﬃciency loss.43
In practice, new information will emerge not only with respect to the
climate change policies of other countries – as is stressed by both the
Garnaut Reports and the Green and White Papers – but also about the
severity, or otherwise, of climate change as a problem and the costs and
beneﬁts of addressing it. As a result, it seems important to retain the ﬂexibility to amend policy, and to have direct political accountability for that
policy, enhancing the likelihood of a timely response. This suggests that
it is indeed desirable to locate responsibility for setting the emissions
path, and the political accountability for that path, directly in a Minister,
rather than delegating that responsibility to an independent body (whose

42

Indeed, an agent that is seeking to develop and preserve a reputation for time consistency
faces the problem that the parties with respect to whom it seeks that reputation can ﬁnd it diﬃcult to distinguish the response to new information from opportunistic conduct. The extent of
the problem can be reduced through transparency of decision-making, and there is a signiﬁcant
trend among central banks towards ever greater disclosure – see for instance Mahadeva and
Sterne (2000). However, given that disclosure is never complete, and explanations of actions
may be viewed as self-serving, some part of the burden of establishing and retaining credibility
is borne by adherence to simple, observable rules, such as the Taylor Rule in monetary policy.
Adherence to these rules inevitably involves a loss relative to the ﬁrst best response to new
information. This is another form of the ‘rules versus discretion’ issue.
43
The costs of delegation are analysed in Alesina and Tabellini (2007a,b).
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response would be hindered by its statutes and operating rules44). The
fact that decisions as to the trajectory of emissions reductions can have
such major eﬀects on Australia’s prosperity, and are not capable of being
reduced to a clear and ﬁxed formula or set of rules that a third party
could be given responsibility for implementing, make the case for direct
Ministerial responsibility all the stronger.45
To that extent, an independent agency should not have ‘outcome independence’, i.e. the scope to set its own targets. This is perhaps comparable to the
position of the Reserve Bank (which under the Statement on the Conduct of
Monetary Policy has an inﬂation target set by the Government46), though
such an agency would also have less ‘instrument independence’ (i.e. control
over the mix of instruments) than has the RBA. In eﬀect, under an ETS without price caps, the objective and the instrument essentially coincide, in that
setting the emissions reduction path automatically determines the volume of
permits to be issued. As a result, the agency’s role, as far as the ETS itself was
concerned, would seem to be relatively narrow and essentially regulatory (i.e.
ensuring compliance), though it might have some responsibilities for monitoring and better promoting eﬃciency and stability in the secondary market.
Whether this is an appropriate or sensible role for an agency that might
otherwise not require much substantive economic and ﬁnancial expertise is an
open question.
In short, while there may be issues associated with time consistency, it does
not seem that they warrant the delegation of responsibility for setting emissions reduction trajectories to a ‘carbon central bank’. Absent that responsibility, such an entity would, in an ETS without price ﬂoors and ceilings, have
a rather limited decision-making role, certainly compared to the RBA, as the
Government’s decisions about the emissions trajectory would eﬀectively
determine the settings for the primary instrument (the volume of permits).
The Garnaut Reports and the Green and White Papers suggest the agency
should also be given responsibility for addressing compensation claims, pre44

The literature on central bank independence stresses that for the independence to be
credible, it must be costly for government to alter the mandate and operations of the central bank. As a result, eﬀective delegation involves constructing bulwarks against change.
The need to then maintain controls against misbehaviour by the agency then induces the
imposing of further constraining rules, to an extent that depends on the costs and likelihood of misbehaviour.
45
The impossibility of devising such a formula, and the high error costs involved in an inappropriate decision, would make monitoring costs very high, undermining the eﬃciency gains
from delegation. It can be shown that the smaller the extent to which the agent’s behaviour can
be made to be rule-bound, and the higher the costs of the inappropriate use by the agent of its
discretion, the greater the other limitations that must be placed on its substantive capabilities –
see generally Komesar (1997). As these limitations erode the quality of the agent’s decisions,
they reduce and may entirely eliminate the net gains from delegation.
46
The scope of the RBA’s statutory independence is controversial, but in practice, likely to
be substantial by convention. That said, the RBA does not have the degree of statutory or
practical independence of the European Central Bank, which both sets its own objectives and
controls its choice of instruments.
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sumably so as to reduce the costs of rent-seeking. This assumes that independence provides assurances against rent-seeking, which runs counter to both
theory and experience with regulatory agencies.47 These suggest that the costs
of rent-seeking (including by the agency itself) are not eﬀectively constrained
by the mere fact of distance or otherwise from the political process. Rather,
they are best constrained by a combination of ﬁrst, procedural safeguards,
including constraints on the forms and nature of interaction between the parties seeking the relevant rents and the decision-maker;48 and second, by narrowly conﬁning discretion in the determination of claims, both through clear
rules that can guide the disposition of those claims and by providing for substantive rights of review. Given such constraints on discretion, the allocation
of the initial decision-making power – be it to a Minister, a Ministerial
Department, or a statutory agency – is not likely to be of great signiﬁcance.
4. Conclusions
The introduction of an ETS would be an event of obvious signiﬁcance for
Australia’s economic prospects. Designing the institutional arrangements for
such an ETS raises important questions about how to deal with the constraints arising from limited information, with the risks of rent-seeking and
with problems of policy credibility.
The standard recipes for dealing with these issues involve a broad range of
options, including earmarking of revenues, as a way of improving public
choice, and the delegation of key decisions to independent agencies, so as to
enhance policy credibility and reduce vulnerability to rent-seeking. This paper
has examined those options, both so as to clarify the general principles
involved and to assess their applicability to the speciﬁc proposals made in the
Garnaut Reports and the Green and White Papers. As noted in the Introduction, this paper does not pretend to be comprehensive in its critique of these
reports and in particular of the proposals emanating from the Garnaut
Reports. Such a critique would ideally tackle a range of other issues, for
instance relating to its discount rate assumptions and the choice of a trading
scheme over a carbon tax.
Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the discussion.
First, while earmarking can have merit, the speciﬁc proposals advanced
in the Garnaut Reports and the Green and White Papers do not. These
47

See Dal Bó (2006) for a recent survey of the relevant literature.
Thus Komesar (1997) stresses the role constraints such as the adversarial and public nature of litigation place on the extent to which courts are vulnerable to rent-seeking relative to
administrative agencies. In a classic article, Vilhelm Aubert explained the ‘formalism’ associated with adjudication as a means of converting the parties involved into ‘professional strangers’, limiting the scope for improper inﬂuence to be brought to bear: Aubert (1967), p. 45.
Fuller (1978) explains that this ‘formalism’ is only eﬀective where disputes can be resolved into
matters of right, and highlights the tendency of ‘polycentric disputes’ (which lack clear ‘guiding
principles’) to degenerate into forms of adjudication that are merely ‘a kind of continuation of
bargaining behind closed doors’: Fuller (1978), p. 397.
48
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proposals are more likely to reduce eﬃciency than to enhance it. The community would be better oﬀ if the revenues raised through the ETS were used to
reduce other, more distorting, taxes.
Second, there may be an issue of time consistency in respect of an ETS, and
to the extent to which there is such an issue, the eﬀect would be to reduce
otherwise desirable investment and innovation. Were such an issue to be dealt
with by delegation of responsibility for setting the emissions trajectory to an
independent ‘carbon central bank’, that bank, if it is to give investors conﬁdence that their investments would not be expropriated, would need to
develop a reputation for placing greater weight on industry proﬁts than on
abatement. This is the opposite of what is commonly supposed.
Third, delegation of responsibility for setting the emissions trajectory to an
independent ‘carbon central bank’ would not, however, be costless. Rather,
so as to reduce agency costs, any delegation is likely to require the entity to
operate according to fairly tightly deﬁned rules, which limit the extent to
which it could respond to new information. Moreover, delegation to a specialised agency would reduce the ability to achieve economies of scope across
policy areas, imposing further costs. Given the many uncertainties that surround the science, economics and international politics of climate change, it
would seem preferable to retain Ministerial responsibility for setting the emissions trajectory. As a result, any ‘carbon central bank’ would have little or no
‘outcome independence’ and (in an ETS without price caps and ﬂoors) very
limited ‘instrument independence’.
Fourth, delegation to such an independent entity of the responsibility for
determining compensation claims is no panacea against rent-seeking. In
eﬀect, theory and experience suggest that the mere fact of independence has
little impact on the extent of rent-seeking and may indeed create rent-seeking
opportunities for the independent agency itself. Rather, rent-seeking costs are
best reduced by setting out clear rules for the allocation of any compensation,
formalising the processes involved in seeking and obtaining compensation,
and providing substantive rights of review of decisions. With those in place,
the location of decision-making powers at ﬁrst instance is of limited signiﬁcance. Given that, it is a matter of opinion whether there is a clear case
for establishing an independent agency, especially since its role should be so
limited.
All of this suggests a far simpler institutional design than proposed in the
Garnaut Review and the Green and White Papers, with no earmarking of
revenues and little role for new institutions. However, these conclusions seem
out of step with the spirit of the times, and it is worth concluding on why that
might be the case.
In his famous 1935 study of the US tariﬀ, Elmer Schattschneider observed
that ‘within limits, every regime can choose and formulate the pressures to
which it will be subjected.’ Thus, through ‘the protective system’, governments ‘stimulate the growth of industries dependent on this legislation for
their existence’. It is these industries, he noted, that ‘form the ﬁghting legions
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behind the policy.’ Equally, ‘the losers adapt themselves to the new conditions imposed upon them, ﬁnd themselves without the means to continue the
struggle, or become discouraged and go out of business.’ By these means ‘new
policies create a new politics’.49
Indeed, shaping such a ‘new politics’ is fundamental to successful policy
entrepreneurship, which requires developing actors and coalitions that can
support and sustain the policy into the future. It does not seem far-fetched to
suggest that the institutional designs set out in the Garnaut Review and the
Green and White Papers pursue this objective, rather than being informed by
the grander goals of economic eﬃciency. In other words, the complexity and
non-transparency of the Scheme as proposed to date may well be a ‘feature’
rather than a ‘bug’ to some of its most avid supporters among the interest
groups that may stand to beneﬁt from it.
Thus, even putting aside the payments to emissions-intensive ﬁrms, the earmarking provides a very substantial stream of net revenues to scientists and
engineers, as inelastic supply encounters a signiﬁcant increase in spending,
driving up prices. Moreover, the greatest rewards would go to those scientists
and engineers involved in emissions-related research, cementing a community
that has been, and could remain, a strong supporter of an ETS. At the same
time, the earmarking promises what could be substantial side payments to
low and middle income earners, reducing the opposition to rising implied carbon prices. Further support would come from industries receiving compensation, especially if that compensation locked in rents that increased with the
ETS price. However inconsistent these uses of the ETS revenues are with
standard welfare maximisation, and however fallacious the notion that everyone (or nearly everyone) can be compensated for the costs of a scheme that
must reduce real income, they may well be highly politically eﬃcacious.
At the same time, any independent agency created to operate the ETS
would likely be an additional advocate for the scheme, much as has happened
with such agencies in many other policy domains. Moreover, such an agency
might well have the ability, through the allocation of compensation revenues,
to create coalitions that unconditionally support its eﬀorts, reducing rather
than enhancing the scheme’s long run eﬃciency.
In short, institutional design is likely to be shaped ﬁrst and foremost by the
primacy of politics. The pity of it is that the economic costs could be so high.
References
Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (2007a). Bureaucrats or politicians? Part I: a single policy task,
American Economic Review 97(1), 169–179.
Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (2007b). Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: multiple policy tasks,
Journal of Public Economics 92(3–4), 426–447.

49

Schattschneider (1935/1974), p. 288.

Ó 2010 The Author
Journal compilation Ó 2010 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

162

H. Ergas

Alston, J.M. and Mullen, J.D. (1992). Economic eﬀects of research into traded goods: the case
of Australian wool, Journal of Agricultural Economics 43(2), 268–278.
Alston, J.M., Freebairn, J.W. and James, J.S. (2004). Levy-funded research choices by
producers and society, Australian Journal of Agricultural & Resource Economics 48(1),
34–64.
Aubert, V. (1967). Courts and conﬂict resolution, The Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 11, 40–51.
Ayson, R. (2004). Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age, Strategy as Social Science.
Frank Cass, London and New York.
Bell, S. (2004). Australia’s Money Mandarins, The Reserve Bank and the Politics of Money.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Berger, H., de Haan, J. and Eijﬃnger, S.C.W. (2001). Central bank independence: an update
of theory and evidence, Journal of Economic Surveys 15(1), 3–40.
Bird, R.M. and Jun, J. (2005). Special Report: Earmarking in Theory and Korean Practice.
The International Tax and Investment Center, Washington, DC.
Blume, L., Rubinfeld, D. and Shapiro, P. (1984). The taking of land: when should compensation be paid? Quarterly Journal of Economics 99, 71–92.
Bovenberg, A.L. and de Mooj, R.A. (1994). Environmental levies and distortionary taxation,
American Economic Review 4, 1085–1089.
Brett, C. and Keen, M. (2000). Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental
taxes, Journal of Public Economics 75(3), 315–340.
Cohen, L.R. and Noll, R.G. (1991). The Technology Pork Barrel. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Crowe, C. and Meade, E.E. (2007). The evolution of central bank governance around the
world, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(4), 69–90.
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